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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1954
seems a good start to say that a court should resolve the matter; i,e., de-
termine by which name the child should be called pending the child's reach-
ing the age of discretion. However, the court that ought to decide the
matter is the court which has jurisdiction of the child, and in -this case that
seems to be the court that granted the original divorce decree. Rather than
raise a future question of which court has jurisdiction in regard to which
name shall be used, the court at most should have issued a temporary re-
straining order pending the decision in Cuyahoga County. The question
remains: when should a court allow a divorced mother to change the name
of a child of the dissolved marriage. Since an award of custody is always
open .to modification, the right should probably be completely denied lest
there be periodic changes in name.9
WALTER PROBERT
EQUITY
Taylor v. Robishav was a suit for specific performance. The original
owner of the two farms involved in the litigation had died and the suit
was against her hers. At the time of the transaction, which was the basis
of the litigation, the deceased was an old and sick woman. First, she signed
what purported to be a lease of the premises, with option to purchase, to
plaintiff. Later, and shortly before her death, she signed a memorandum
purporting to give the premises to the plaintiffs. At the rime of the lease
plaintiffs took sole possession of the farms but five months before her
death, the deceased returned and lived with the plaintiffs for the remainder
of her life. The only witnesses to the instruments and the sole witnesses
at the trial as to their execution were the plaintiffs. The court held that
such contracts must be looked at in a "scrupulous manner." Such contracts
can be enforced only when they are clearly proved by positive testimony and
the interests of the witnesses in the outcome of the case may be considered.
The court in applying this test came to the conclusion that the instruments
and the transaction were the result of undue influence and because de-
ceased was unable to exercise deliberate judgment. Consequently, plaintiff's
action failed.
The growing number of cases across the country in which strangers or
distant relatives of elderly people have come forward after the death of the
'That an attorney's fees for his work in a divorce case must be sued for as an incident
of a marital suit is brought home by Rubinstein v. Watson, 118 N.E.2d 232, (Ohio
App. 1954). The unsuccessful attorney found that her client (the wife) had achieved
reconciliation. She tried to recover her fees from the husband in an independent
action.
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latter and sought to enforce either oral contracts, contract evidenced by
only informal instruments or parol gifts against the heirs has caused the
courts of Ohio and other states to view such daims with an ever increasing
sharpness as is evidenced in the present decisions. Although the legislatures
of the various states have shown no particular interest in the matter, the
courts, show a definite tendency to return to a strict application of the
Statute of Frauds in cases of this type.
In Dependabilt Homes, Inc. v. White,2 after almost half of the pur-
chase price of a house and lot had been paid under a land contract, an action
for cancellation was brought because defendant (the purchaser) was in
default as to three monthly payments. Before the case was submitted on
its merits the defendant tendered into court a sum sufficient to cover the
unpaid balance on the purchase price, interest and court costs. The trial
court refused to allow this as a defensive maneuver and allowed the can-
cellation. The appellate court noted that the contract provided for de-
livery of a warranty deed upon full payment of the price and held that it
would be inequitable to order the cancellation and take from defendants the
equity which had accrued to them in the real estate when plaintiff would
receive the essential performance of its promise. Plaintiff's petition was
dismissed.
In Heriott v. Marine3 plaintiff agreed to buy and defendant to sell cer-
tain realty used as a public tavern. It was agreed that if the liquor permits
could not be transferred the contract would become null and void and the
cash down payment would be returned to the plaintiff. When it was
discovered that the permits could not be transferred, plaintiff brought a
recission action. The court dismissed the plaintiff's petition on the ground
that the remedy prescribed in the contract for the recovery of the down
payment was the exclusive remedy to which plaintiff was entitled.
This result would be justified were this only a matter of failure of per-
formance. However, the court says that plaintiff alleged in the petition
that the defendants had "fraudulently" withheld the information that de-
fehdant's son in whose name the permits were held had been been con-
victed of a felony and it was for this reason that the permits could not be
transferred. In view of the fraud it would appear that plaintiff should
have been able to rescind the entire transaction regardless of what remedies
might have been given her in the contract for nonperformance thereof.
The appellate courts of Ohio have repeatedly avoided establishing an
over-all standard as to the necessity of intent in an action to punish for
1 121 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio App. 1954).
2 117 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio App. 1951).
'96 Ohio App. 174, 121 N.E.2d 305 (1953).
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contempt of violation of an order of a court. In Taylor v. Holmes' the
defendant had been ordered to cover garbage placed in a dump with earth at
the close of each day's operations. Without his knowledge a load of gar-
bage was dumped and left uncovered. The next day, as soon as he dis-
covered this fact, he immediately covered the garbage. It would appear
clear that defendant was entirely without intent to violate the court's order
and was in good faith. But it would also appear dear that he did violate
the court's order. On the appeal from the trial court's finding of contempt
the appellate court quoted Univis Lens Co. v. United Electrical Radio &
Machine Workers of America thus: "Whether or not intent is a necessary
element, it seems, is dependent upon the nature of the act complained of."
On the facts of the present case, the court went on to say, the trial court's
finding must be reversed because the act was not done intentionally. A
study of this opinion and the cases cited therein leave only- confusion as
to what action amounts to contempt without intention to violate the court's
order and as to the nature of the "intentional" action necessary when it is
a required element.
In State v. Smith6 certain persons who assembled together were charged
with rioting. The assemblage was also in violation of an injunction. (The
rioting was not proved.) The court held a conviction on an indictment
will not purge a contempt, nor a conviction for a contempt be a bar to an
indictment even though the act of contempt and the act for which the in-
dictment issues be the same physical act.
In Socotch v. Krebs7 it was held not to be contempt of court for the
Ohio State Board of Liquor Control to fail to obey an order of a trial court
requiring the Board to renew a liquor permit when such renewal would
have been a nullity in view of the fact that the permit had been issued only.
to allow business at a specified address.
Following a divorce, in which custody of a son was given to the wife, the
wife remarried. When the son started to school he was enrolled on the
school records under the surname of the wife's second husband. On peti-
tion of the boy's father the court issued a mandatory injunction requiring
the school authorities to enroll him under the father's surname.' The court
held that although a person could, other than for fraudulent purposes,
change his own name, another could not change it for him. The court was,
of course, saying that a mother could not change the name of her infant
son. The result seems subject to question in that it tends to point out an
'96 Ohio App. 181, 121 N.E.2d 320 (1954).
'86 Ohio App. 241, 89 N.E.2d 658 (1949).
897 Ohio App. 86, 121 N.E.2d 199 (1954).
797 Ohio App. 8, 119 N.E.2d 309 (1953).
'Kay v. Bell, 95 Ohio App. 520, 121 N.E.2d 206 (1953).
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